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those of mortgagees. The mortgagee will normally accept a mortgage as
security for a loan only after a thorough credit check of the applicant, an
inspection of the record title of the property and a physical inspection of the
land. The mechanic is not in a bargaining position to demand such things as
waivers nor can he afford to make thorough investigations of those who re-
quest his services. The mortgagee should not be allowed to have the swollen
value of his secured asset accrue to him at the expense of the mechanics and
materialmen whose time, money, labor and material have made the increased
value a reality. The mechanics and materialmen, having fully performed,
should have a higher priority in foreclosure than the mortgagee who has suf-
fered only a defeat of his expectations by the failure of the mortgagor to
repay the personal obligation for which the mortgage served as security.
If the court maintains a rigid adherence to the time-priority rule, a more
equitable solution than the rule of the present case would' be to measure the
reasonable value of the services rendered by the mechanics and, as to that
amount, allow the mechanic first recovery from the proceeds of the fore-
closure sale. After the pool has been depleted to this extent, the full amount
of the mortgage claim would be disbursed and the mechanic would take the
remainder, if any, to make up any difference between the reasonable value
of his services and the contract price. This method would allow the interests
and equities to remain undisturbed; the mortgagee's anticipated enhance-
ment of the property's value would be subordinated to the reasonable value
of services rendered by the mechanic, while the mechanic's anticipated profit
would be inferior to the bargained-for benefit of the mortgagee.
The Fleharty, Industrial Tile and American-First decisions are demon-
strative of the judicial inconsistency which can be caused by legislative
ambiguity. The Oklahoma Legislature, which has not removed the ambiguous
language from its statute, must bear the major portion of the responsibility
for the confusion surrounding the question of which class of claimants is to
be favored. It remains to be seen whether the seven years of legislative
silence following the decision in Industrial Tile was an affirmation of that
interpretation of the statute or was the implied delegation of law-making
power to the court, for these diametrically opposite results on priority cannot
both reflect the intent of the legislature. The need for legislative action in
this area is clear and the type of legislation needed should reflect a balancing
of bargaining positions between mortgagees and mechanics and materialmen. •
JAMES B. KkomsrEic
Municipal Corporations—Special Assessments—Local Improvement Dis-
tricts.—Heavens v. Ring County Rural Library Dist. 1—This case in-
volves the constitutionality of a special or betterment assessment for the con-
struction of a library. A 1961 Washington statute2 empowers rural library
districts to form local improvement districts' and to finance new libraries by
1 404 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1965).
2
 Wash. Rev. Code § 27.14.020 (Supp. 1963).
8 A rural county library, district is a library serving all the area of a county not
762
CASE NOTES
levying special assessments where the newly constructed buliding "are of
special benefit to part or all of the lands in the district." 8 Defendant King
County Rural Library District sought to finance a new library by creating
such an improvement district and levying a special assessment. The plaintiffs,
property owners subject to assessment, contended that libraries confer an in-
tangible benefit and that their construction therefore cannot constitutionally
be financed by specially assessing local landowners .° The trial court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint. The Supreme Court of Washington HELD: that the
special assessment was invalid, indicating that public libraries do not bring
a special benefit to neighboring land.
The court correctly focused on the issue of special benefit in determining
the validity of the special assessment.? The requirement of a special benefit
is primarily constitutional: 8
 the courts have frequently indicated that a
special assessment without a special benefit would be a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process. 8 The constitutions of some of the states impose
similar requirements." Article 7, Section 9 of the Washington Constitution
specifically limits special assessments to the property benefited. Also, legisla-
tures frequently require a special benefit in statutes authorizing special assess-
ments." For example, the Washington Code prescribes that the assessment
should be levied "on all property specially benefited by any local improve-
ment."12
 Legislatures sometimes require such a benefit by implication by
describing the property that shall be subject to the assessment, an example
of which would be a sidewalk improvement where the statute provides that
the assessment be levied against abutting property."
Generally, the special benefit that is required is a benefit that is more
intense to the assessed property than it is to all property within the mu-
nicipality." Where the primary purpose and effect of an improvement is to
included within the area of incorporated cities and towns. Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 27.12.010(5) (1963).
4
 A local improvement district is a subdivision within a library district in which a
library is deemed desirable. It can be established by either the governing board of the
library district or by a petition of the residents within the district. Wash, Rev. Code
§ 27.14.020 (Supp. 1963). In the instant case, the local improvement district was established
by the library district. The court here took judicial notice of the fact that the district
was extensive in area. Supra note 1, at 455.
 -
6 Wash. Rev. Code § 27.14.020 (Supp. 1963).
6
 Brief for Plaintiff Heavens, p. 50, supra note 1.
7
 Lloyd v. City of Redondo Beach, 124 Cal. App. 541, 546, 12 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1932).
Certain exceptions to this requirement, such as exercise of police power, are not relevant
here.
8
 Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1898); Garcia v. Falkenholm, 198 A.2d
660 (R.I. 1964).
9
 See, e.g., Seidlitz v. County of Faribault, 237 Minn. 358, 361, 55 N.W.2d 308, 311(1952) ; In re Shilshole Ave., 85 Wash. 522, 537, 148 Pac. 781, 787 (1915).
10
 See, e.g., Minn. Const. art. IX, § 1.
11
 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 13-29 (1960) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 50-2905
(1957).
12
 Wash. Rev. Code 27.14.020 (Supp. 1963).
18 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 371.642 ( 1963).
14
 Fisher v. City of Astoria, 126 Ore. 268, 277, 269 Pac. 853, 856 (1928).
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benefit the general public, there is no special benefit." The courts do not,
however, hold invalid special assessments where there is mere incidental bene-
fit to the unassessed landowners." Nor does an additional benefit to certain
property constitute a special benefit when it is merely incidental." Future
or potential benefit may be considered," but it should not be so speculative
as to render it uncertain."
The ever-increasing revenue demands on municipalities dictate that
some of the legal principles regarding special assessments be re-examined.
Generally, cities and towns are forced to rely on a general real estate tax,
charges for services rendered, and special assessments to meet their revenue
needs. Since many improvements do not lend themselves to special charges, 2°
and since political considerations can often prevent increases in the general
real estate tax, special assessments might be the only means of financing
needed additional services.
Certain types of improvements have been categorized as suitable or un-
suitable for special assessments, and courts sometimes automatically approve
or disapprove special assessments for them, 2' perhaps because certain im-
provements bring far greater benefit to adjoining land than to less proximate
areas. Examples of suitable types of improvements are streets, 22 curbing,28
paving,24 sewers,25 and parks.2° In the instant case, the court attempted to
analogize between improvements, relying heavily on a case in which a special
assessment for a public auditorium was held inappropriate. 27
Some courts have already suggested that the type of improvement should
not be determinative. 28 Rather, inquiry should be made in each case into
whether the specific property is actually benefited. Thus, the type of neigh-
borhood should play an increasingly important role—an improvement would
15 Williams v. Arkansas County Courthouse Improvement Dist., 153 Ark. 469, 475,
240 S.W. 725, 728 (1922).
16 Mullins v. City of Little Rock, 131 Ark. 59, 67, 198 S.W. 262, 266 (1917) ; City
of Waukegan v. Dewolf, 258 Ill. 374, 381, 101 N.E. 532, 535 (1913) ; Village of Edina v.
Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 92, 119 N.W.2d 809, 815 (1962).
17 Williams v. Arkansas County Courthouse Improvement Dist., supra note 15.
15 Crampton v. City of Royal Oak, 362 Mich. 503, 517, 108 N.W.2d 16, 22 (1961);
In re Arch Hurley Conservancy Dist., 52 N.M. 34, 50, 191 P.2d .338, 348 (1948).
19 Ibid.; D'Antuono v. City of Springfield, 114 Ohio App. 102, 106, 180 N.E.2d 607,
610 (1960).
20 Special charges are usually flat rates employed where an attempt to pay off the
cost of the improvement or service would result in prohibitive rates. For example, muni-
cipalities supply water to residents and charge a set amount per faucet. If such an ap-
proach were employed with regard to a library, its cost would never be paid off unless
prohibitive rates were charged for its use.
21 See, e.g., In re Improvement of Lake of the Isles Park, 152 Minn. 29, 35, 188
N.W. 54, 57 (1922).
22 Butters v. City of Oakland, 263 U.S. 162 (1923).
23 Kraushaar v. Zion, 196 Misc. 437, 94 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
24 City of Moundsville v. Brown, 127 W. Va, 602, 34 S.E.2d 321 (1945).
28 Fisher v. State, 69 Nev. 236, 246 P.2d 804 (1952).
25 Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 611 (1898); In re Improvement of Lake of the
Isles Park, supra note 21.
27 Lipscomb v. Lenon, 169 Ark. 610, 276 S.W. 367 (1925).
28 City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376 III. 327, 330, 33 N.E.2d 598, 600 (1941).
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have a different effect in a residential neighborhood from that in an industrial
area; the particular characteristics of the improvement are still important—
unsightly buildings would have a deleterious effect in a suburban neighbor-
hood; and the adaptibility of the improvement to the neighborhood pattern
should be given greater consideration—some "improvements" might actually
be nuisances in a residential neighborhood. Since it requires a case-by-case
analysis, use of this suggested approach might be difficult, but it is more con-
sistent with the underlying theory of special assessments, namely, payment for
benefit received."
The courts have generally indicated that the amount of the special benefit
is the difference between the fair market value before and after the improve-
ment." Fair market value can be reached: First, by ascertaining the
value of the property by comparable sales, second, by determining the cost
of the property and depreciating it to its present age, and third, by ascer-
taining the amount of money necessary to produce an income equal to that
of the property.3'
Perhaps the most readily apparent method of measuring the amount of
an increase in fair market value is determining the increase in resale value
after the improvement. It is difficult, however, to place a dollar value on the
effect on resale value of a given improvement. For example, the addition of
a public park near residential property will certainly boost the amount a
buyer would be willing to pay, but it is impossible to say just what the dollar
value is to the seller. The utility of this method pales when it is remembered
that few property owners are interested primarily in owning real estate for
resale purposes.
In certain cases, there are other and perhaps more accurate methods of
measuring the amount of increase in fair market value. If an improvement
saves a homeowner the cost of a comparable utility, this cost could reflect
the amount of his benefit. For example, if the installation of a sewer line
makes unnecessary the purchase of a septic tank, the owner has saved the
price of the tank, and this saving is a tangible benefit. Or if the construction
of a new fire station reduces local insurance rates, this saving is also a bene-
fit.32 The sum of the savings thus gained would represent a more tangible
gain to the homeowner than would increase in resale value. Moreover, ascer-
tainment of the amount of this type of gain would be quite simple. This ap-
proach, however, is applicable only in limited situations, 33 and it should
not be used to force a homeowner to pay for improvements that govern-
ment has traditionally been required to provide.
29 Norwood v. Baker, supra note 8.
30 City of Philadelphia v. Conway, 257 Pa. 172, 178-79, 101 At!. 472, 474 (1917);
In re Schmitz, 44 Wash. 2d 429, 434, 268 P.2d 436, 439 (1954).
31
 American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate 66 (3d ed.
1962).
32
 The possibility of this type of benefit was treated in In re Jones, 52 Wash. 2d
143, 145, 324 P.2d 259, 260 (1958).
33
 It would be difficult to measure this saving in most situations. For example, how
could the savings, if indeed there are any, from the proximity of a library or the con-
struction of a street be measured?
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Another method of ascertaining the extent of the special benefit would,
in certain cases, be to determine the amount of increased income that the
improvement brings to the landowner. If a municipal parking lot increases
the amount of rent that can be charged in a retail district, this increase is
a benefit to the landlord." This method would also allow the landowner to
be taxed on in-pocket benefits rather than paper profits. While it is possible
that the increase in fair market value might be determined by increase in
resale value, increased income, or savings from the provision of a needed im-
provement, it is suggested that the full impact of all these savings might not
be reflected in an isolated determination of fair market value. Thus, where
the homeowner has been spared a five hundred dollar expense, but his resale
value has not increased, his benefit would still be five hundred dollars. The
municipalities should therefore be able to assess the benefit by that of the
three methods which yields the greatest gain.
Turning to the instant case, the court found that libraries cannot produce
a special benefit. The court relied heavily on a Arkansas case that had set
aside a special assessment for a public auditorium." This approach should
be discouraged since there are obvious factual differences between auditoria
and libraries,38
 and very probably there were differences between the neigh-
borhoods involved. The determination of a special benefit should be made to
turn on the individual facts and not upon prior . judicial determinations in-
volving dissimilar _facts.
It is a well-recognized principle of appraisal that the existence of libraries
and similiar facilities are relevant factors in setting the value of real estate,
especially in residential neighborhoods. One authority 87 states that: "Cul-
tural institutions such as libraries, colleges, and universities all tend to
serve as beneficial factors in the neighborhood pattern." 38
 In the Encyclo-
pedia of Real Estate Appraising, some of the factors for determining value
are: (1) Character of neighborhood buildings; (2) neighborhood planning
and design; and (3) schools, churches, shopping centers and recreational
areas." It is submitted, therefore, that libraries do have an effect on value.
Whether this effect is present in a degree sufficient to produce a special benefit
should not be the subject of a universal rule. Rather it should be determined
by evidence relating to the particular improvement, especially the testimony
of real estate appraisers. While it may be that the library in the instant case
did not create a special benefit, the court should have made it clear that this
was a factual determination. It is at least possible that under different cir-
cumstances a library, especially a branch library, could create a special
benefit.
84 Sec City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 664; 668, 151 P.2d 5, 7 (1944) for the
advantageous effect that a parking lot might have on the surrounding property.
85
 Lipscomb v. Lenon, supra note 27.
BO An auditorium would be more likely to attract people from a greater distance
and would tend to interfere with a residential neighborhood pattern because of the large
crowds it would serve.
87
 Amer. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, supra note 31.
88
 Id. at 95.
89
 Anderson, Appraisal of Residential Property, Encyclopedia of Real Estate Ap-
praising 156 (Friedman ed. 1962).
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In selecting the method to be employed in determining the extent of any
special benefit, it appears unrealistic to attempt to determine the cost of
a comparable service. Actually the benefit measured by this test would be
the expense and inconvenience involved in travel to the next nearest library,
hardly a significant benefit. Nor does it appear that the erection of a library
in a neighborhood would be an income producing improvement. While it
might be a limited factor in determining the fair rental value of an apartment
building, this would apply only in certain situations. It thus appears that if
indeed a library does confer any special benefit, it will best be reflected in
property resale value. The determination of amount under this standard will
be properly Ieft to the appraisers.
JAMES P. DOHONEY
Products Liability—Strict Tort Liability—Liability of a Manufacturer
for "Economic Loss."--Seely v. White Motor Co. 1—The plaintiff purchased
a truck from a dealer under a conditional sales contract, The truck had
been manufactured by the defendant who made the following express war-
ranty:
The White Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor
vehicle sold by it to be free from defects in material and workman-
ship under normal use and service, its obligation under the war-
ranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts
thereof... 2
Upon taking possession of the truck, the plaintiff found it to be un-
satisfactory because of a violent bouncing effect known as "galloping." For
nearly a year thereafter, the dealer, acting under the guidance and direction
of the manufacturer, attempted unsuccessfully to remedy this defect. Subse-
quently, the brakes failed and the truck was extensively damaged when it
overturned in a non-collision accident. After the plaintiff had repaired this
damage, he notified the dealer that he would make no more payments on
the contract. The dealer consequently repossessed the truck and resold it
for an amount greater than the deficiency.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the manufacturer 3 both
for the damages "related to the accident," namely the cost of the repairs, 4 and
for the damages "unrelated to the accident," the amount paid toward the
purchase price and the profits which had been lost because the truck had
been unfit for normal use. 3 The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff
for these "unrelated damages" which had arisen independently of the
accident as a result of the defendant's breach of its express warranty.° Re-
1
 45 Cal, Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
2
 Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148.	 •
3 The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice to his action
against the dealer. Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148.
4
 Id. at 19-20, 403 P.2d at 147-48.
0 Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148.
6
 Ibid.
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